We give an example of a three person chess-like game that has no Nash equilibrium in pure stationary strategies. The game has seven positions, four outcomes (a unique cycle and three terminal positions), and its normal form is of size 2 × 2 × 4 only. Thus, our example strengthens significantly the one obtained in 2014 by Gurvich and Oudalov, which has four players, five terminals, and 2×4×6×8 normal form. Due to its small size, we can strengthen our new example further, by showing that it has no Nash equilibrium not only in pure but also in independently mixed strategies, for both Markov and a priori realizations.
In 1950, Nash introduced his fundamental concept of equilibrium for n-person games [25, 26] . After this, it become natural to ask, whether one can extend the above solvability results to n-person chess-like games, replacing the concept of a saddle point by the more general concept of Nash equilibrium (NE), either assuming (C) or not: (Q): Does every chess-like game have an NE in pure stationary strategies? (Q C ): Does every chess-like game satisfying condition (C) have an NE in pure stationary strategies?
Obviously, positive answer to (Q) would imply positive answer to (Q C ). It was conjectured in [3] that both questions have the same answer and in [19] that this answer is negative. A corresponding example for (Q) was constructed in [17, 18] . 1 This example has n = 4 players, p = 5 terminals, a unique cycle of length 5, and its normal form is of size 2 × 4 × 6 × 8.
In Section 3 of this paper, we construct a much smaller example: the game has only seven positions, n = p = 3, there is a unique cycle, which is of length 2, and the normal form is of size 2 × 2 × 4.
The small size of this example allows us to strengthen the result further by proving that the obtained game has no NE not only in pure but also in independently mixed strategies, for both a priori and Markov realizations; see Section 4 for precise definitions.
Recall that in [5] a game was called play-once if every player controls only one position. For such games, the sets of mixed and independently mixed strategies coincide and an (independently) mixed NE, for the a priori realization, always exists by Nash's Theorem [25, 26] . Yet, this theorem is not applicable to the Markov realization and in this case the existence of an NE in mixed strategies for the play-once games remains an open problem. However, under condition (C), it follows from the results [5] that an NE exists already in pure strategies.
The game from our example is "almost play-once", in the sense that only one player controls two positions, while each of the other two controls a unique position, which shows that our example is in a sense sharp.
Returning to pure strategies, let us recall that question (Q C ) remains open in general. A corresponding example, if there is one, would strengthen simultaneously the main example of the present paper and of [19] ; see Figure 2 and Table 2 therein.
In the last section of [5] it was shown that the answer to (Q C ) is positive for p = 2. An attempt to extend this result to p = 3 was made in [8] . However, later the authors found a flaw in the proof and, thus, this case remains open. Moreover, question (Q) remains open for p = 2. We conjecture that the answer to (Q C ) is negative in general.
Conjecture 1.
There exists a chess-like game satisfying condition (C) and with no NE in pure stationary strategies.
Some supporting arguments for this conjecture can be derived from results of [3] , as follows. In Table 1 of that paper, several concepts of solvability are summarized. Consider the first four rows of this table. In even rows condition (C) is assumed, while in odd rows it is not. Thus, this part of the table contains 16 pairs of questions (similar to (Q) and (Q C )) and for each pair, condition (C) is required in one of the two questions but not in the other one. in [3] , 30 questions (15 pairs) are answered. Among the 30 answers, 22 are negative and 8 are positive, but interestingly, no answer ever depends on condition (C), that is, in each of these 15 pairs either both answers are negative, or both are positive; in other words, condition (C) turns out to be irrelevant in all those cases.
Our pair of questions, (Q) and (Q C ), form the 16th pair of the table. In this paper we answer (Q) in the negative, while (Q C ) remains open. Yet, taking the above observations into account, we second [3, 19] and conjecture that the answer to (Q C ) is the same as to (Q) , that is, negative. However, the counterexample for (Q C ) may need to be much larger than our example for (Q).
In Section 5, we discuss a positive answer to question (Q) for the case of two players. 1 One of the authors of [18] refused to be a coauthor of paper [17] published in Russia.
In Section 6 we will show that if the answer to (Q C ) is negative, then there exists a chess-like game satisfying (C) in which c is the only NE outcome (although it is worse than any terminal for each player).
As we mentioned, it follows from the results of [5] that for the play-once chess-like games the answer to (Q C ) is positive, yet, (Q) remains in this case open.
Basic definitions
Chess-like games are finite positional n-person games with perfect information without moves of chance. Such a game can be modeled by a finite directed graph (digraph) G = (V, E), whose vertices are partitioned into n + 1 subsets, V = V 1 ∪ . . . ∪ V n ∪ V T . A vertex v ∈ V i is interpreted as a position controlled by player i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, while a vertex v ∈ V T = {a 1 , . . . , a p } is a terminal position (or just a terminal, for short), which has no outgoing edges. A directed edge (v, v ) is interpreted as a (legal) move from position v to v . We also fix an initial position v 0 ∈ V \ V T . We assume that all considered games are connected, that is, there is a directed path from v 0 to each position v ∈ V and, in particular, to every terminal position a ∈ V T .
The digraph G may have (directed) cycles. It is assumed that all cycles of G are equivalent, that is, they form a unique outcome c of the game. Thus, such a game has q = p + 1 outcomes that form the set A = {a 1 , . . . , a p , c}.
To each pair consisting of a player i ∈ I and outcome a ∈ A we assign a payoff value u(i, a) specifying the profit of player i in case outcome a is realized. The corresponding mapping u : I × A → R is called the payoff function. In the literature, payoff may alternatively be referred to as reward, utility, or profit; the negated payoff may be referred to as cost.
A chess-like game in positional form is a quadruple (G, D, u, v 0 ), where To define the normal form of a chess-like game we will need the concept of a strategy. A (pure and stationary) strategy of a player i ∈ I is a mapping that assigns a move (v, v ) to each position v ∈ V i .
In almost all sections of this paper, we restrict ourselves and the players to their pure stationary strategies. The history dependent strategies will not be considered at all, while the mixed ones will only be considered in Section 4. In other sections words "pure stationary" may be given in parentheses or omitted.
Once each player i ∈ I chooses a (pure and stationary) strategy s i , we obtain a collection s = {s i | i ∈ I} of strategies, called a strategy profile or a situation. In a chess-like game modeled by a digraph, to define a situation we have to choose, for each vertex v ∈ V \ V T , a single outgoing arc (v, v ) ∈ E. Thus, a situation s can be also viewed as a subset of the arcs, s ⊆ E. Clearly, in the subgraph G s = (V, s) corresponding to a situation s there is a unique walk that begins at the initial vertex v 0 and either ends in a vertex from V T , or results in a cycle. In other words, each situation uniquely defines a play P (s) that begins in v 0 and either ends in a terminal a ∈ V T or forms a "lasso", that is, consists of a (possibly empty) initial path and a cycle repeated infinitely. In the latter case the play results in the outcome c ∈ A. Thus, in condition (C), one can replace "an infinite play" by "a lasso". 
This way we obtain a game form, that is, a mapping g : S → A, where S = S 1 × . . . × S n is the direct product of the sets of strategies of players i ∈ I. By this definition, g(s) = c whenever P (s) is an infinite play and g(s) = a whenever P (s) terminates in a ∈ V T . The normal form of a chess-like game (G, D, u, v 0 ) is defined as the pair (g, u), where g is the game form of the positional game structure (G, D, v 0 ) and u : I × A → R is a payoff function. Let us note that game forms and games in normal form are of independent interest and can be studied without underlying positional game structures.
Given a game in normal form (g, u), let us fix a situation s = {s i | i ∈ I} ∈ S and a player i 0 ∈ I. Then, we can represent s as {s i0 , s −i0 }, where s −i0 is the set of strategies in s of the n − 1 players i ∈ I \ {i 0 }. We say that player i 0 can improve on s if (s)he has a strategy s i0 such that
A situation s is called a Nash equilibrium (an NE) if no player can improve on s. In other words, s is an NE if no player i ∈ I can profit by replacing his/her strategy s i in s by a new strategy s i , assuming that the other n − 1 players keep their strategies from s unchanged.
In our constructions and proofs it will be more convenient to use instead of a payoff function u : I ×A → R a preference profile o = ( 1 , . . . , n ), where i , for each player i ∈ I = {1, ldots, n}, is a complete linear order over A that defines the preference of the player i over all outcomes of A. More precisely, we write a i a if u(i, a) > u(i, a ) for a, a ∈ A and i ∈ I. Note that one needs no ties, u(i, a) = u(i, a ), to construct NE-free examples. With the new notation, the positional and normal form of a game are represented by the quadruple (G, D, o, v 0 ) and the pair (g, o), respectively.
Main example
We now describe our main example: a three-person chess-like game (G, D, o, v 0 ) in positional form without an NE in pure stationary strategies. The quadruple (G, D, o, v 0 ) is as follows:
• G = (V, E) is the 7-vertex digraph depicted in Figure 1 .
• D is the partition of V given by V = V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ V 3 ∪ V T , where V T = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } is the set of terminal positions and the partition V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ V 3 is defined by the labels of the vertices.
• The set of outcomes is A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , c}, where c represents the unique cyclic outcome. The preference profile o is a triple o = ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) , where i is a complete linear order over A that defines the preference of player i, for each i ∈ I. Yet, we will not specify a preference profile o completely, but give, for each player, a strict partial order over the outcomes. Then, as a preference profile o, we can take any set of complete linear extensions of these strict partial orders, They are indicated in Figure 1 : for player 1, we can take as 1 any complete linear order over A such that a 2 > a 1 > a 3 and c > a 1 .
(In the figure, we write for brevity {a 2 , c} > a 1 > a 3 ). For player 2, the complete linear order 2 is specified as a 3 > a 1 > a 2 > c. The case of player 3 is similar to the case of player 1 and 3 is given by the partial order {a 1 , c} > a 3 > a 3 ). There are four possible preference profiles o satisfying the above constraints.
• The initial position v 0 is indicated by the square in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Our main example: an NE-free three-person chess-like game in positional form.
Having specified the positional form (G, D, o, v 0 ) of the game, we now turn to its normal form. Since we work with the preference profile rather than with the payoff function, the normal form of the game will be given by the pair (g, o), where g is the game form of the positional game structure (G, D, v 0 ). In our example player 1 controls a unique position, namely v 0 , which is of out-degree 2 in G. Hence, the set S 1 of strategies of player 1 has only two elements; they will be indicated simply by 2 and 3, depending on whether the move (v 0 , v ) assigned to position v 0 by the corresponding strategy has v ∈ V 2 or v ∈ V 3 , respectively. Player 2 controls two positions, say v and w (where (v, w) ∈ E is a directed edge). Both of these positions are of out-degree 2. In the first one there are two moves, namely (v, w) and (v, a 1 ); since w ∈ V 2 , we will denote these two moves by 2 and a 1 , respectively. Similarly, in position w there are two moves, (w, z) and (w, a 2 ), where z is the unique vertex of V 3 ; these two vertices will be denoted by 3 and a 2 , respectively. Thus, the set S 2 of strategies of player 2 has four elements, denoted simply by (2, 3), (2, a 2 ), (a 1 , 3), (a 1 , a 2 ); these two coordinates specify the moves assigned to vertices v and w, respectively. Player 3 also controls a unique position, which is of out-degree two. Hence, S 3 has only two elements, indicated by 2 and a 3 .
Our example therefore has 2 × 4 × 2 = 16 situations s ∈ S = S 1 × S 2 × S 3 . Recall that the game form g is the mapping assigning to each situation s ∈ S the terminal outcome a ∈ V T of the play P (s), if this play is finite, or the cyclic outcome c, otherwise. The values of g are shown in Figure 2 . Proof. It is sufficient to show that for every situation s ∈ S there exists a player i ∈ I and a situation s that differs from s only in coordinate i such that g(s ) i g(s). In other words, player i can strictly profit by replacing the strategy s i in s by a new strategy s i resulting in situation s , assuming that all other players keep their old strategies from s.
The proof of this fact is depicted in Figure 3 , where the table representing the values g(s) ∈ A of the game form in Figure 2 is modified by replacing each entry a = g(s) with an entry of the form a i where i ∈ I, meaning that there exists a situation s that differs from s only in coordinate i and such that g(s ) i g(s). For example, the entry corresponding to the situation s = {2, (a 1 , a 2 ), a 3 } is a 2 1 , indicating that there exists a situation s that differs from s only in coordinate 2 and such that g(s ) 2 g(s) = a 1 . Indeed, if player 2 replaces the current strategy (a 1 , a 2 ) with (2, 3), the obtained situation s = {2, (2, 3), a 3 } will result in an improvement, since g(s ) = a 3 2 a 1 = g(s). Note that the outcome g(s) = a 3 of the situation s = {3, (a 1 , 3), a 3 } has two upper indices, since s can be improved by each of the two players, 1 and 3. Remark 1. The above example contains a unique cycle, which is of length 2. The game restricted to the positions of this cycle and terminals a 2 and a 3 does not have a uniform (or, equivalently, subgame perfect) NE; see [1, 3] . This is not a coincidence: we remark (without giving a proof ) that in any NE-free example with a unique cycle, the restriction of the game to the positions of this cycle and all positions that can be 
Figure 3: The three-person game depicted on the left in positional form has no NE in pure stationary strategies. To verify this, one only needs to check that from each entry of the table, it is possible to move in one of the three directions, say in direction i, to another entry specifying an outcome that is strictly better than the original one for player i. Such directions (players) are indicated by the upper indices.
reached from it (not necessarily in one move), results in a game with no uniform (subgame perfect) NE. This idea was the starting point for our computer based search of NE-free games.
NE-freeness in independently mixed strategies for a priori and
Markovian realizations
Main concepts
In the whole paper, we restrict ourselves, and the players, to stationary strategies only. We do not consider history dependent strategies. For this reason, adjective "stationary" will be sometimes omitted. In Section 3 we considered pure strategies; now we will consider mixed ones. Mixed strategies of a player are standardly defined as probabilistic distributions over the set of all pure strategies of this player. An independently mixed strategy of player i ∈ I is given by a collection of probability distributions on the sets of moves (v, v ) from a position v, controlled by player i, for all positions v ∈ V i controlled by i. Obviously, every independently mixed strategy of player i can be viewed as a mixed strategy, but not vice versa unless the player controls a unique position. In particular, the sets of mixed and independently mixed strategies coincide only in the case of play-once games, in which each player controls only one position.
In the "independently mixed" setting, we denote by S i the set of independently mixed strategies of a player i ∈ I; a situation s ∈ S = S 1 × . . . × S n is then a collection of independently mixed strategies, one for each player. The notion of an NE is extended in the natural way, taking into account the expected payoff of the players. Suppose that the payoff values u(i, a) are given, specifying the profit of player i in case outcome a is realized. Then, the expected payoff of player i ∈ I is the function φ i : S → R defined as
where P(s, a) is the probability that outcome a ∈ A is realized in the game, assuming that the players play according to the independently mixed strategies specified by s ∈ S. A situation s ∈ S is then called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for each player i ∈ I and for each situation s that may differ from s only in one coordinate i, we have φ i (s) ≥ φ i (s ). In a chess-like game, a play may visit the same position more than once, and we distinguish the following two realizations of the game. The Markov realization assumes that for every player i and for each position of this player, (s)he randomizes the choice of the move each time the play comes to this position. In contrast, the a priori realization assumes that for every player i and for each position of this player, the random choice of the move at this position is done only once, before the game begins, and the obtained move is used whenever the play comes to this position. Clearly, the probabilities P(s, a) of the outcome might differ for these two models.
The concept of a priori realization was introduced in [4] in 2013, when NE-free examples with respect to a fixed initial position were not known yet. In [4] uniform (subgame perfect) NE-free examples were constructed.
Remark 2. Let us recall that for the play-once games the sets of mixed and independently mixed strategies coincide. Hence, in this case, the existence of an NE in independently mixed strategies is guaranteed by the classical Nash's Theorem [25, 26] . Yet, this is true only for the a priori realization, but not for the Markov one. In the latter case Nash's Theorem is not applicable, because the expected payoff, as a function of probabilities, may be discontinuous. Indeed, for the Markov realization, a given directed cycle may be obtained with a positive probability only when every move along this cycle has probability 1, but if there is a move in this cycle which is chosen with probability strictly less than 1, then the probability of this cycle being realized jumps to 0. In contrast, for the a priori realization, a cycle may appear with a positive probability whenever each move along this cycle has a positive probability.
Thus, for solving play-once games in mixed strategies, the a priori realization fits better than the Markov one. This is an important application of the first concept. In contrast to the Markov realization, it is not easy to construct a model for which the a priory realization would be naturally applicable.
It follows from the results of [5] that every play-once game has an NE already in pure strategies provided condition (C) holds. However, without this assumption the question whether a play-once game has an NE, in pure or even in (independently) mixed strategies, remains open.
In the rest of the section, we prove that the example from Figure 1 has no NE not only in pure but also in independently mixed strategies, for both Markov and a priori realizations. In both cases we adopt notation from Figure 4 4 . We will assume this notation in the next two subsections. For background on Markov decision processes, we refer to [24] .
NE-freeness in independently mixed strategies for a priori realization
We strengthen the result of Proposition 1 by modifying the example so that it has no NE in independently mixed strategies for the a priori realization. The example is modified by replacing the preference profile o = (o 1 , o 2 , o 3 ) (which implies certain inequalities among the payoff values u(i, a) for each player i ∈ I) with a set of more specific constraints on the payoff values u(i, a) over all players i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all outcomes a ∈ A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , c}. Theorem 1. The three-person chess-like game described in Figure 1 has no NE in independently mixed strategies for the a priori realization whenever the payoff function u satisfies the following conditions:
and for all δ with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, at least one of the following inequalities holds:
u(2, a 1 )
For a specific payoff function satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1, consider for instance the following function:
It is straightforward to verify that the given payoff function satisfies the requirements. In particular, condition (7) holds for all ρ > 1/11 and condition (8) holds for all ρ < 1/10.
Proof. Let (G, D, o, v 0 ) be a three-person chess-like game described in Figure 1 and let u : I × A → R be any payoff function consistent with the preference profile o, in the sense that u(i, a) > u(i, a ) whenever a i a for all a, a ∈ A and i ∈ I, and satisfying the assumptions of the theorem. The expected payoffs of the game are given by formula (1), which involves the outcome probabilities P(s, a) for all s = {α, β, γ, δ} ∈ [0, 1] 4 and all a ∈ A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , c}. Analyzing the directed paths from the initial position to each terminal position and to the cycle in G, we obtain:
Suppose for a contradiction that the game has an NE, say s
, in independently mixed strategies for the a priori realization. Note that
Indeed, if 0 < α * < 1, then the definition of an NE implies that α * is a local maximum of f 1 , where
as claimed. Similarly, we infer that
, and
where
. We can write these three implications concisely as:
In a similar way, we obtain analogous implications involving values of the other three components of s * :
Since for all i ∈ I and all (α, β, γ, δ) ∈ [0, 1] 4 we have
we obtain
and similar expressions hold for for all η ∈ {α, β, γ, δ} and all a ∈ A.
For η = α, we obtain:
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, c) ∂α
For η = β, we obtain:
For η = γ, we obtain:
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, c) ∂γ
For η = δ, we obtain:
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, c) ∂δ
To simplify the rest of the proof, we observe that the general case of a payoff function satisfying the assumptions of the theorem reduces to the case when u(1, a 3 ) = u(2, c) = u(3, a 2 ) = 0. Indeed, if the equalities u(1, a 3 ) = u(2, c) = u(3, a 2 ) = 0 do not hold, then we can replace u with the modified payoff function u given by u (1, a) = u(1, a) − u(1, a 3 ), u (2, a) = u(2, a) − u(2, c), and u (3, a) = u(3, a) − u(3, a 2 ) for all a ∈ A; clearly, such a change does not affect the set of NEs.
We will thus assume in what follows that u(1, a 3 ) = u(2, c) = u(3, a 2 ) = 0. Plugging the derivatives given by equations (11)- (14) into (10) yields, together with implication (9) and the assumption u(1, a 3 ) = 0, the following:
Similarly, we get:
Proof. Suppose that (1 − β * )γ * δ * = 0 and α * < 1. By (P 1 ), we have (
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that α * > 0, γ * (1 − δ * ) = 0, and β * > 0. By the first implication in (P 2 ), we obtain −α * u(2, a 1 ) + α * (1 − γ * )u(2, a 2 ) ≥ 0, which further simplifies to (1 − γ * )u(2, a 2 ) ≥ u(2, a 1 ), contrary to the assumption u(2, a 1 ) > u(2, a 2 ) > 0.
Proof. Suppose that α * β * (1 − δ * ) = 0 and γ * > 0. By the second implication in (P 2 ), we obtain −(α
Since both summands are non-negative, it follows that α * β * + (1 − α * )δ * = 0.
Proof. Suppose that (1 − α * + α * β * )γ * = 0 and δ * > 0. By (P 3 ), we have
Since both summands are non-negative, it follows that 1 − α
Proof. Suppose that γ * = 1 and δ * < 1. By (P 3 ), we have ( a 3 ) > 0, this implies (1−α * )+α * β * ≤ 0, and, since both summands are non-negative, that 1 − α * + α * β * = 0.
We now prove several claims.
Proof. Since α * > 0 and β * > 0, we infer from (P 2 ) that
Moreover, assumption (5) implies u(2, a 1 ) > (u(2, a 2 ) + u(2, a 3 ))/2. Combining the two inequalities and separating the terms involving u(2, a 2 ) from those involving u(2, a 3 ), we obtain
which, using the facts that γ * δ * ≥ 0 and u(2, a 3 ) > 0, implies
Since u(2, a 2 ) < u(2, a 3 ), we infer γ * > 1/2, as claimed.
Proof. Since δ * < 1 and 1 − α * + α * β * γ * > 0, we infer from (P 3 ) that
Furthermore, inequality (6) together with u(3, a 2 ) = 0 implies u(3, a 3 ) < u(3, c)/2. Combining the two inequalities and canceling out the positive factor u(3, c), we obtain
which, using 1 − α * + α * β * γ * > 0, simplifies to 2γ
Suppose for a contradiction that γ
We conclude that γ * < 1/2, as claimed.
Claim 3. If α * > 0, β * > 0, and δ * < 1, then α * = 1 and γ * = 0.
Proof. Suppose that α * > 0, β * > 0, and δ * < 1. From Claims 1 and 2 we infer that (1 − α * ) + α * β * γ * ≤ 0. Since both summands are non-negative, both are in fact zero, that is, α * = 1 and β * γ * = 0. Since β * > 0, we obtain γ * = 0.
Proof. Suppose that β * > 0 and 0 < δ * < 1. If α * > 0, then Claim 3 implies that γ * = 0, from which we obtain, using Observation 2A, a contradictory β * = 0. Therefore, α * = 0. Since α * β * + (1 − α * )δ * = δ * > 0, we can now use Observation 2B to infer that γ * = 0.
Claim 5. Either β * = 0 or δ * ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that β * > 0 and 0 < δ * < 1. By Claim 4, we obtain α * = γ * = 0. Since δ * > 0, this contradicts Observation 3A.
Claim 6. β * > 0.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that β * = 0. We infer from Observation 2B that (1 − α * )δ * = 0 or γ * = 0. Suppose that δ * = 0. Then α * = 1 by Observation 1. But now, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ 2 (1, 0, γ * , 0) = u(2, a 1 ) to φ 2 (1, 1, 1, 0) = u(2, a 3 ) by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1), contrary to the fact that s * is an NE. 
It follows that δ * > 0. Suppose that α * < 1. Then (1 − α * )δ * > 0 and hence γ * = 0. Since 1 − α * + α * β * γ * > 0 and δ * > 0, this contradicts Observation 3A. We thus have α * = 1. By the assumption on the payoff function, at least one of inequalities (7) and (8) holds for ρ = δ * . Using u(1, a 3 ) = u(2, c) = 0, the two inequalities simplify to u(1, a 1 ) < δ * u(1, c) and u(2, a 1 ) < (1 − δ * )u(2, a 3 ), respectively. Suppose first that u(1, a 1 ) < δ * u(1, c). Then, player 1 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ 1 (1, 0, γ * , δ * ) = u(1, a 1 ) to
by changing his/her strategy to α = 0.
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE. Suppose now that u(2, a 1 ) < (1 − δ * )u(2, a 3 ). Then, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from 
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and completes the proof of Claim 6.
Claim 7. 0 < β * < 1 and δ * ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. The fact that δ * ∈ {0, 1} follows from Claims 5 and 6; it thus suffices to show that 0 < β * < 1. Suppose this is not the case. Then β * = 1 by Claim 6. Observation 1 implies that either δ * = 1, γ * = 1, or α * = 1. Suppose that δ * = 1. Then α * = 0 by Observation 2A. Furthermore, Observation 2B implies that γ * = 0. Therefore s * = (0, 1, 0, 1) is an NE of (G, D, o, v 0 ) in pure strategies, contradicting Proposition 1. We conclude that δ * = 0, which implies, in particular, that γ * = 1 or α * = 1. Since β * = 1, we have 1−α * +α * β * = 1 and Observation 3B implies that γ * < 1. Therefore, α * = 1. But now, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ 2 (1, 1, γ a 3 ) by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1).
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and completes the proof of Claim 7.
Claim 8. δ * = 0.
Proof. Suppose that δ * > 0. Then δ * = 1 by Claim 7. By the same claim, β * > 0, which implies that α * β * + (1 − α * )δ * > 0, hence Observation 2B yields γ * = 0. Next, Observation 3A implies that α * = 1. But this contradicts Observation 2A.
We now have everything ready to derive the final contradiction, which will complete the proof of Theorem 1. We have 0 < β * < 1 and δ * = 0 by Claims 7 and 8. From Observation 1, we infer α * = 1. This in turn implies, using Observation 2A, that γ * > 0. But now, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from a 3 ) by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1).
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and completes the proof.
NE-freeness in independently mixed strategies for Markovian realization
We now turn to the case of the Markov realization.
Theorem 2. The three-player chess-like game described in Figure 1 has no NE in independently mixed strategies for the Markov realization whenever the payoff function u satisfies the following conditions:
Proof. Recall that the expected payoffs of the game are given by formula (1), which involves the outcome probabilities P(s, a) for all s = {α, β, γ, δ} ∈ [0, 1] 4 and all a ∈ A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , c}. We claim that the outcome probabilities are the following:
The independently mixed strategies of the players defined by the 4-tuples (α, β, γ, δ) can also be viewed as the set of transition probabilites in digraph G, creating a Markov chain (see Figure 4) . The expected payoffs are computed according to the limit distribution of this Markov chain. If γδ < 1, then the Markov chain has three absorbing classes corresponding to the three terminals and the limit probability of the 2-cycle c is zero. If γδ = 1, then the Markov chain has two absorbing classes, terminal a 1 and the 2-cycle c. Digraph G has a unique walk from the initial position to a 1 , which is realized with probability α(1 − β), independently of whether γδ < 1 or not; this establishes P(α, β, γ, δ, a 1 ) = α(1 − β). Suppose that γδ < 1. Let v and w be the two positions controlled by player 2 such that (v, w) ∈ E(G) and let z ∈ V 3 be the unique vertex controlled by player 3. The walks from v 0 to a 2 can be classified into two types depending on whether they pass through v or not. If the walk passes through v, then its sequences of edges is of the form (v 0 v, vw, (wz, zw) k , wa 2 ) for some k ≥ 0, and the probability of its occurrence is αβ(γδ) k (1 − δ). Otherwise, it is of the form (v 0 z, zw, (wz, zw) k , wa 2 ) for some k ≥ 0, and the probability of its occurrence is
Summing up these probabilities, we obtain
as claimed. A similar computation yields the claimed formula for the value of P(α, β, γ, δ, a 3 ). If γδ = 1, then the probability of the occurrence of c equals the probability of reaching a vertex of c from the initial position, which is clearly (1 − α) + (αβ). If the Markov chain reaches the cycle, then it will stay on it with probability one, hence in this case the limit probability of a 2 or a 3 is zero.
, in independently mixed strategies for the Markov realization. We split the proof into six exhaustive cases depending on the values of α * , β * , γ * , δ * , and show that each of them leads to a contradiction.
In this case, there are only two possible outcomes: a 1 with probability α * (1 − β * ) and c with probability 1 − α * + α * β * . Suppose that α * > 0 and β * < 1. Then player 1 would be able to strictly improve his/her expected payoff from c) , by changing his/her strategy to α = 0.
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and shows that either α * = 0 or β * = 1. In both cases, player 2 would be able to strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ 2 (α * , β * , 1, 1) = u(2, c) to φ 2 (α * , 1, 0, 1) = u(2, a 2 ), by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 0).
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and settles Case 1.
Let us first explain the reason for the conditions of this case. The expected payoff of player 2 is a convex combination of u(2, a 1 ), u(2, a 2 ), and u(2, a 3 ), that is,
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 with λ + µ ≤ 1. The coefficients are given by
Recall that u(2, a 3 ) > u(2, a 1 ) > u(2, a 2 ) and note that coefficients λ and µ are both zero if β * = γ * = 1. Thus, if λ + µ > 0, then player 2 can strictly improve his/her payoff to u(2, a 3 ), by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1) -provided that also δ
Furthermore, note that λ + µ is positive if and only if the scaled quantity (λ + µ)(1 − γ * δ * ) is positive, and that
where the second equality can be routinely verified by separating the terms into those involving α * and the rest.
Thus, under the assumptions of Case 2, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from a 3 ) , by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1) . This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and settles Case 2.
Assuming that the conditions of Cases 1 and 2 are not satisfied, that is, γ * δ * < 1 and either δ * = 1 or α
we split the rest of the proof into four exhaustive cases.
Case 3: β * γ * = 1 and δ * < 1.
In this case, player 3 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ
, by changing his/her strategy to δ = 1.
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and settles Case 3.
Case 4: α * = 0 and δ * = 0.
In this case, we have β * γ * = 1, since otherwise s * = (0, 1, 1, 0) would be an NE of (G, D, o, v 0 ) in pure strategies, contradicting Proposition 1. Moreover, as the outcome of the game is a 3 with probability one, the expected payoff of player 1 is u (1, a 3 ) , the worst possible for him/her. If player 1 changes his/her strategy to α = 1, then his/her expected outcome would become a 3 ) , with λ and µ as given by (16) with α * = 1. For α * = 1, β * γ * < 1 (which is true as argued above) and δ * = 0, we have α a 3 ), hence player 1 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff by changing his/her strategy to α = 1.
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and settles Case 4.
Case 5: γ * < 1 and δ * = 1.
We split this case into three further subcases depending on the values of α * and β * (assuming, in all the subcases, that γ * < 1 and δ * = 1).
Subcase 5.1: α * > 0 and β * = 1.
In this case, the outcome of the game is a 2 with probability one, hence the expected payoff of player 2 is u(2, a 2 ). If player 2 changes his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (0, γ * ), then his/her expected outcome would become φ 2 (α * , 0, γ a 2 ) , which, since α * > 0, is a strict improvement over
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and settles Subcase 5.1.
Subcase 5.2: α * > 0 and β * < 1.
In this case, the expected payoff of player 1 is
, a convex combination of u(1, a 1 ) and u(1, a 2 ), with strictly positive coefficient at u (1, a 1 ) . If player 1 changes his/her strategy to α = 0, then his/her expected outcome would become φ
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and settles Subcase 5.2.
In this case, player 3 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ a 3 ), by changing his/her strategy to δ = 0.
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and settles Subcase 5.3 and with it Case 5.
Case 6: α * = 0, γ * = 1, and δ * < 1.
In this case, player 3 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ 3 (0, β * , 1, δ * ) = u(3, a 3 ) to φ 3 (0, β * , 1, 1) = u(3, c), by changing his/her strategy to δ = 1.
This contradicts the fact that s * is an NE and settles Case 6.
It remains to show that Cases 1-6 exhaust all possibilities. Perhaps the easiest way to observe this is to notice that if none of the assumptions of Cases 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 hold, then Case 2 must hold. Indeed, assuming that Cases 1 and 5 do not hold, we infer that δ * < 1. If in addition that Case 3 does not hold, then we have β * γ * < 1. If Case 4 fails, then we have α * > 0 or δ * > 0, and if Case 6 fails, then α * > 0 or γ * < 1. Together, all these inequalities imply that α
, which together with δ * < 1 shows that the assumptions of Case 2 hold. This completes the proof.
5 Two-person chess-like games are Nash-solvable
In this section we recall for completeness the following known result:
Theorem 3. Every two-person chess-like game has an NE in pure stationary strategies.
A proof of this result can be found in Section 3 of [5] ; see also Section 12 of [7] . Since the proof is short, we will repeat it here for reader's convenience. It is based on an important property of two-person game forms that seems to be not generalizable for n > 2. A two-person game form g is called:
(i) Nash-solvable (NS) if for every payoff function u = (u 1 , u 2 ) the game (g, u) has an NE.
(ii) zero-sum-solvable if for every u = (u 1 , u 2 ) that satisfies u 1 (a) + u 2 (a) = 0 for all a ∈ A the game (g, u)
has an NE.
(iii) ±1-solvable if the corresponding game (g, u) has an NE for every u = (u 1 , u 2 ) such that u 1 (a)+u 2 (a) = 0 for each outcome a ∈ A and both u 1 and u 2 take only values +1 or −1.
Recall that an NE of a two-person zero-sum game, as in cases (ii) and (iii), is usually called a saddle point.
Theorem 4. The above three properties of two-person chess-like game forms, (i) Nash-solvability, (ii) zerosum-solvability, and (iii) ±1-solvability, are equivalent.
The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) was shown in 1970 by Edmonds and Fulkerson [10] , and independently in [13] . Soon (i) was added to the list in [14] ; see also [15] . It was also shown in these papers that similar statements for three-person game forms fail.
To describe the proof of Theorem 3 we need to define one more commonly used notion, that of forcing. Given a subset Y ⊆ A of outcomes and a subset X ⊆ V of positions, we say that player i ∈ I can enforce Y from X if player i has a strategy s i such that for any v 0 ∈ X and for all strategies s −i of all the other players, the resulting outcome g(s i , s −i ) belongs to Y . It is well known that given a set Y ⊆ A of terminal positions, the unique maximal subset X ⊆ V from which player i can enforce Y can be constructed by the following recursive procedure starting with X = Y . If v ∈ V i \ X and there exists an outgoing arc (v, v ) with v ∈ X, then add arc (v, v ) to s i , and add v to X. If v ∈ V j \ X for some j = i and all outgoing arcs (v, v ) are such that v ∈ X then add v to X.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Theorem 4 it is sufficient to prove ±1-solvability. Hence, we can assume that each outcome a ∈ A = V T ∪ {c} is either winning for player 1 and losing for player 2, or vice versa. Without any loss of generality, we can also assume that c is a winning outcome for player 1.
Then, let V T = V was suggested by Andrew Volgin in 2012 (at the time he was a high-school student); see Figure 5 . Figure 5 : A 2×2×2 game form that is tight but not Nash-solvable. We use the same notation as in Figures 1  and 3 .
Each of these two examples has three players and four outcomes. An example with three players and three outcomes is known too, but it has larger size; a tight but not Nash-solvable game form of size 6 × 6 × 6 was given in [15] ; see also [5] . It is also important to notice that none of these three examples represents the normal form of a chess-like positional game structure, while the three-person 2 × 4 × 2 game form constructed in the present paper does; furthermore, it is also tight but not Nash-solvable.
In fact, Theorem 3 can be reformulated as follows: any finite chess-like positional game structure has a tight game form. The proof given above still holds; one should only replace two players 1 and 2 with two complementary coalitions K and I \ K, while all the arguments remain the same.
Remark 3. In Remark 3 of [14] it was mistakenly claimed that tightness is necessary for Nash-solvability of any n-person game form. A counterexample was given by Vladimir Danilov in 1987. A smallest example of a three-person 2 × 2 × 2 game form that is Nash-solvable but not tight appeared in [15] .
6 On chess-like games satisfying (C) and having only cyclic NE In a chess-like game, an NE is called terminal if the corresponding outcome is a terminal position, otherwise it is called cyclic. Conjecture 1, if true, would imply the following, somewhat surprising corollary. Proposition 2. If the answer to question (Q C ) is negative then there exists a chess-like game that has an NE but no terminal one.
Proof. Take any chess-like game Γ that satisfies (C) and has an NE s with outcome c, for example, one of the two games shown in Figure 6 .
Recall that we restrict ourselves only to connected games, that is, games for which every (terminal) position is reachable from the initial position. By our assumption related to problem (Q C ), there exists an NE-free game Γ that satisfies condition (C), too. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that the games Γ and Γ have disjoint sets of players and positions. Let us identify all terminals of Γ into a single vertex v t , and then identify v t with the initial vertex v 0 of Γ . Clearly, the obtained game Γ , with initial vertex v 0 of Γ, is connected, since both games Γ and Γ are connected. Furthermore, Γ and Γ have the same set of the terminals.
We keep the same preferences for the players I of Γ as before, while for the players of I of Γ, let us introduce arbitrary preferences over the outcomes V T of Γ such that these preferences satisfy condition (C). Recall that s is a situation in Γ that is an NE with outcome c and extend s by arbitrary strategies of the players of I . The obtained situation s in the game Γ is also an NE with outcome c. Indeed, by assumption, no player i ∈ I can reach v t by replacing his/her strategy provided all players of I \ {i} keep their strategies in Γ.
Let us show that a terminal NE, say σ , cannot exist in Γ . Indeed, if the play P (σ ) reaches a terminal of Γ then it must pass v t . Since σ is a terminal NE in Γ , its restriction to Γ must be a terminal NE in Γ . Yet, by assumption, there exists no such NE. This contradiction proves our statement.
Summary and open ends
The main example of this paper answers question (Q) in the negative. More specifically, a previous example [17, 18] is reduced considerably: in terms of the number n of players (3 instead of 4), the number p of terminals (3 instead of 5), and the size of normal form (2 × 2 × 4 instead of 2 × 4 × 6 × 8). Furthermore, the game is "almost play-once", in the sense that only one player (instead of two) controls more than one position.
Due to the small size of our example, we were able to further strengthen the result by proving that the obtained game is NE-free not only in pure, but also in independently mixed strategies, for both a priori and Markov realizations.
Let us repeat that in the case of play-once games, the sets of independently mixed and mixed strategies coincide. Therefore in this case an NE in mixed strategies for the a priori realization always exists, by Nash's Theorem [25, 26] , while for the Markov realization the situation is more complicated.
Let us return to pure strategies and recall that for the case of play-once games, as well as for the case of two terminals a positive answer to question (Q C ) was given in [5] . A positive answer to question (Q) for the case of two players was discussed in Section 5. Yet, the following questions remain open:
• question (Q C ) in general and, more specifically, for the case of three terminals;
• question (Q) for the case of two terminals as well as for the case of play-once games (with or without the assumption p = 2).
We also propose an open question of whether the following very general claim holds:
• If a Chess-like game (G, D, o, v 0 ) has no NE in pure stationary strategies, then there is a payoff function u consistent with the preference profile o such that the corresponding game (G, D, u, v 0 ) has no NE in independently mixed strategies. Such payoff functions exist for both (a) a priori and (b) Markov realizations.
Let us note that (a), if true, immediately implies, by Nash's Theorem [25, 26] , that any play-once game has an NE in pure stationary strategies, which is true [5] . Note also that (a) cannot be replaced by (b) in the above statement.
As already mentioned, for the play-once games the sets of mixed and independently mixed strategies coincide, for both the Markov and a priori realizations. In the latter case an NE in (independently) mixed strategies always exists, due to Nash's Theorem. Yet, for the Markov realization the question remains open. Nash's arguments based on the Brouwer [9, 26] and the Kakutani [20, 25] Theorems can not be applied for the Markov realization, because in the Markovian case the expected payoff function may be discontinuous on the direct product of the mixed strategies of all players. For example, in the game represented in Figures 1 and 4 the probability of the cycle to be realized as an outcome is 0 unless γδ = 1, in which case the probability may jump to a strictly positive value.
Thus, it is an open question whether a play-once game always has an NE in pure strategies, or even in mixed strategies for the Markov realization.
In closing, let us note that a uniform (subgame perfect) NE in the mixed strategies may fail to exist in a play-once game, for both Markov and a priori realizations [4] .
